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I. Introduction
Multinational firms are an increasingly important part of international economic
integration. In recent years, foreign direct investment has been increasing at a rate that
exceeds both the rate of growth of international trade and that of income. For many
countries, the sales of affiliates of multinational firms have long dwarfed the value of
trade. For example, in 1997, European Union country firms exported $283 billion in
products to the United States. In the same year, affiliates of E.U.-based multinational
firms sold $816 billion worth of products in the United States, almost three times the
value of exports.
Further, multinational firms play an important role in international trade.
Intrafirm trade is international trade that occurs between different affiliates of the same
multinational firm. Consider figure 1. For the United States, intrafirm trade is
approximately 40% of all international trade. In addition, multinational firms also do a
great deal of arms-length trade; for the U.S., this accounts for an additional 37% of all
international trade. Trade that has nothing whatsoever to do with multinational firms is a
mere 23% of the total. Understanding the role of multinational firms in an environment
of increasing international economic integration is therefore essential for policy-makers.
As can be seen in figure 2, for bilateral trade between the United States and
European Union countries, intrafirm trade is approximately 45% of all international
trade. As shown in this figure, this average masks important differences between
countries within the European Union. Countries like Greece and Portugal have very little
intrafirm trade with the United States; for Italy 22% of trade is intrafirm; for France,
Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Luxembourg, over 50% of trade with the
United States is intrafirm.
1 Figure 3 indicates that the importance of intrafirm trade is
increasing somewhat over this time period (1982-1997), particularly during the early
1990s. In the earlier years, the share of intrafirm trade hovered close to 43% ; in the
most recent year available, the share was 49%.
What is the significance of intrafirm trade? There are several issues, which may
be of importance. First, the behaviour of intrafirm trade is empirically different from
trade between unaffiliated entities. As demonstrated below, in common empirical
models of trade, intrafirm trade behaves quite differently with respect to key economic
variables such as income, income per-capita, exchange rates, and the distance between
trading partners. In addition, variation in intrafirm trade is harder to account for in the
models that are typically used in empirical studies of international trade. Given these
                                               
1 Note: Data on Luxembourg is not included in figure 1 due to data inconsistencies but intrafirm trade is
known to be far greater than 50% of the total.2
behavioural differences, it may be difficult for policy makers and forecasters to predict
how intrafirm trade will respond to changes in the economic or policy environment.
Second, intrafirm trade may be influenced by tax considerations. For instance,
multinational firms have an incentive to locate in low-tax countries, and this foreign
investment acts to stimulate intrafirm trade to a greater extent than non-intrafirm trade.
Further, firms acting to minimise their worldwide tax burden have an incentive to alter
prices and quantities of intrafirm trade in order to shift income to more lightly-taxed
locations. There is evidence that U.S. intrafirm trade balances have been affected by
such considerations; Clausing (1998) finds that the U.S. tends to have less favourable
intrafirm trade balances with low tax countries. This finding is congruent with tax
minimisation incentives. Also, Clausing (2000b) finds that intrafirm export prices are
lower for low tax countries, while intrafirm import prices are higher, a finding that is
also consistent with tax-minimising behaviour.
Such findings may be particularly important for European Union countries. As
European Union countries have completely liberalised trade between members without
the harmonisation of corporate tax rates or systems, opportunities for multinational firms
to minimise tax burdens through their intrafirm trade transactions are plentiful. This tax
minimising behaviour would have important consequences both for the revenues of the
individual E.U. member countries, and for the nature of trade amongst the E.U.
members. If intrafirm trade transactions were utilised to shift income to low tax
countries, this would result in lost revenue to those countries that retain higher tax rates.
In addition, intrafirm trade that is influenced by tax considerations may no longer be
efficient. In particular, it is certainly possible that true comparative advantage could be
clouded by tax considerations such that exports need not originate in the lowest cost
country.
Third, intrafirm trade may respond differently to changes in exchange rates. The
theoretical literature, however, is ambiguous regarding the nature of this difference.
Some work argues that multinational firms should be more responsive to exchange rate
changes due to their superior international networks that allow them informational
advantages. Other work argues that multinationals may be slower to respond to
exchange rate changes. Clausing (2000b) finds equivocal evidence that intrafirm trade is
more responsive to exchange rate variables. Since intrafirm trade is a large percentage of
total trade, its responsiveness to exchange rate changes will substantially influence the
overall speed of economic adjustment.
In addition, there may be political economy considerations. As multinational
firms operate in several countries, they are able to alter sourcing and pricing decisions in
response to exchange rate changes, insulating themselves from dramatic swings in
exchange rates. In fact, recent research (Rangan and Lawrence, 1999) has confirmed that
U.S. multinational firms’ sourcing decisions are indeed quite responsive to changes in
exchange rates. Cross-border investments and production facilities are therefore likely to
make fluctuations in exchange rates more tolerable for firms.
This paper undertakes an empirical investigation of how intrafirm trade may
differ from trade conducted at arm’s length, employing a gravity equation model. The
gravity equation is arguably the most empirically successful approach to estimating the
magnitude of international trade between countries. In the framework of a gravity
equation, trade is hypothesised to depend positively on the trading partners’ economic
size and negatively on the distance between them. Such equations have been
successfully employed to study international trade patterns, the effects of regional trade3
agreements, and the role of geography in international trade. In this paper, I estimate a
gravity equation model of international trade for the United States, estimating separate
equations for the two types of trade in order to allow intrafirm trade to differ from
conventional trade conducted at arms-length. I find that the gravity equation model
performs quite differently with respect to intrafirm trade and arms-length trade. In
particular, almost all of the estimated coefficients in the model are statistically different
for the two types of trade, and the model as a whole has far less explanatory power with
respect to intrafirm trade. Such results lead one to the conclusion that intrafirm trade is,
in fact, different.
II. Background
This paper will estimate a gravity equation model of international trade. The
basic estimating equation is as follows.
ln (Tradeij) = a + b1 ln (GDPi* GDPj) + b2 ln (GDPper capitai*GDPper capitaj) +
b3ln(distanceij) + b4Z + uij  (1)
This is a very typical specification, similar to those employed in many previous
empirical studies of international trade, among them Frankel (1997), Rauch (1996),
Helliwell (1998), Head and Reis (1998), McCallum (1995), and Sapir (1997).
There is now a substantial body of literature, including work by Andersson
(1979), Bergstrand (1985, 1989, and 1990), and Markusen (1986), that justifies the use
of gravity equations theoretically. Bergstrand (1985), for instance, utilises consumer and
producer maximisation to generate a gravity equation where the trade flows between two
countries depend on country incomes, distance, and price and exchange rate variables.
Further, this model can be expanded (see Bergstrand (1989)) to incorporate relative
factor endowment differences and non-homothetic preferences. More recently,
Deardorff (1998) has found that it is possible to derive a gravity equation from
straightforward Heckscher-Ohlin foundations as well as models that rely on
differentiated products. This is perhaps not terribly surprising, given the intuitively
reasonable nature of the variables that are included in the equation. As Deardorff (1998)
notes, “I suspect that just about any plausible model of trade would yield something very
like the gravity equation, whose empirical success is therefore not evidence of anything,
but just a fact of life”.
The individual variables included in the specifications and their empirical
interpretation will be discussed in greater detail below. However, some preliminary
discussion is warranted. Trade is hypothesised to depend positively on the economic size
of the trading partners, and negatively on the distance between them. Economic size is
measured in two ways, by the GDPs of the countries as well as by their GDPs per-capita.
This is mathematically equivalent to including the variables GDP and population
instead, although the interpretation of the variables would likely differ. Several
rationales for including GDP per-capita (or population) have been offered in the
literature, including the observation that more populous countries tend to be less open to
trade, and that countries tend to trade more as their stage of development (captured by
GDP per-capita) increases. Deardorff (1998) has argued that if preferences are not
homothetic such that high-income consumers consume capital intensive products in
disproportionate amounts, then we would expect to find these countries trading more4
than average with each other and less than average with low-income, labour-abundant
countries.
2
Any model with transportation costs could generate a role for distance in the
equation. Still, distance may capture other factors in addition to transportation costs,
such as cultural familiarity or the ease of provision of services that accompany trade in
goods. An excellent discussion of the role of distance in trade is provided in Frankel
(1997), chapter 3.
While the gravity equation can be derived from the major theories of
international trade, and has been quite successful empirically, the question of concern
here is whether one should question its applicability to intrafirm trade. Are there
theoretical reasons to suspect that intrafirm trade would respond differently to the
economic variables that are included in the gravity equation? Are there other
considerations that may be important for determining intrafirm trade that are left out of
the gravity model?
Intrafirm trade may behave differently for at least three reasons. First, it may be
more sensitive to tax influences. Second, it may be more or less responsive to changes in
economic variables such as exchange rates or incomes. Third, the composition of
intrafirm trade could differ from that of conventional trade in ways that would affect its
behaviour. Intrafirm trade may be more likely to be trade in intermediate products, for
instance. Given these considerations, would one then expect the gravity model to be as
empirically successful with respect to intrafirm trade? That remains an open question,
and the main question of this paper.
III. Data and Results
This paper estimates a gravity equation model of international trade. The
baseline specifications follow.
ln (Tradeijt) = a + b1 ln (GDPit* GDPjt) + b2 ln (GDPper-capitait*GDPper-
capitajt) + b3ln(distanceij) + b4Z + uijt  (2)
ln (Intrafirm Tradeijt) = a + b1 ln (GDPit* GDPjt) + b2 ln (GDPper-
capitait*GDPper-capitajt) + b3ln(distanceij) + b4Z + uij  (3)
ln (Non-Intrafirm Tradeijt) = a + b1 ln (GDPit* GDPjt) + b2 ln (GDPper-
capitait*GDP per-capitajt) + b3ln(distanceij) + b4Z + uij  (4)
In these equations, the subscript i indicates the United States while subscript j indicates a
trading partner; 54 partner countries are included in the data set.
3 The time period
studied is from 1982 to 1997.
4 These equations are estimated using U.S. data on trade
                                               
2 Frankel (1997, p.59) has a particularly nice illustration for why including GDP per-capita may be
important:  “China and Japan have roughly the same aggregate outputs. Yet China trades less with its
partners than does Japan. This is what the equation would lead us to expect, because China’s large output
derives primarily from its large population, while Japan’s derives from its high level of GNP per capita.”
3 Since I am using data on intrafirm trade, I am constrained in my choice of country-pairs to those that
have the appropriate intrafirm data which (for now at least) limits the sample to pairs that include the
United States. The partner countries included are all of those for which the Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA) consistently provides detailed data.
4 These are the years for which the Bureau of Economic Analysis has published comparable data on
intrafirm trade.5
from the U.S. International Trade Commission, data on GDP and GDP per-capita from
the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics yearbooks
5, and
data on intrafirm trade from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Distance is
calculated between major cities in the U.S. and the partner country.
6 All time varying
variables are adjusted to reflect real values. GDP and GDP per-capita are in constant
1990 U.S. dollars. Trade values are also adjusted to 1990 U.S. dollars using U.S. import
and export price indexes. Summary statistics for the data set are given in table 1.
In addition to the income and distance variables, various dummy variables (Z)
are included to capture countries with which the U.S. has a special trading relationship.
Dummy variables are used for Israel in the years post-1984 when the U.S.-Israel Free
Trade Agreement was in effect, for Canada starting in 1989 (for the Canada-United
States Free Trade Agreement), and for Mexico and Canada starting in 1994 (for
NAFTA). It is common in gravity equation specifications to include such dummy
variables to capture the effects of free trade agreements. In this case, one is also
capturing to some extent the effects of adjacency since (in two of the three cases) the
countries with special trading relationships with the United States are also those that
border the United States.
The specification given in equation (2) above is the most common gravity
equation estimated in empirical studies of international trade. Equations (3) and (4)
differ only in that they allow intrafirm trade to be estimated separately from non-
intrafirm trade. For most specifications discussed in this paper, I have defined intrafirm
trade to include trade between U.S. parent firms and their affiliates in foreign countries.
This includes both U.S. exports from parent firms to their affiliates abroad as well as
U.S. imports from U.S. affiliate firms abroad to their parent firms at home. Non-
intrafirm trade is defined to be trade between unaffiliated entities, and total trade is then
the sum of intrafirm trade and non-intrafirm trade. Trade that is excluded from the initial
analysis, but considered further below, is intrafirm trade between foreign parent
multinational firms and their affiliates in the United States. For now, I focus solely on
U.S. multinational intrafirm trade.
The first results are shown in Table 2. In this table, the three equations are
estimated together as a system. Although estimating the equations together does not
substantively change the estimates (since the same right-hand side variables are included
in each equation), this is still a useful procedure since it allows one to perform joint
tests. Consider first column 1. This equation comes closest to the conventional gravity
equation studies of trade; one important difference should be noted, however. This
equation is estimated using only data on bilateral trade between the United States and
other countries; most gravity equation studies use data on many more country pairs that
would not include the United States, such as Germany-France, Japan-Thailand, etc. This
consideration alone implies that the coefficient estimates in equation 1 are different from
those commonly estimated in gravity equation studies. Several differences stand out.
7
                                               
5 The IMF’s International Financial Statistics are also the source for other macroeconomic variables
employed in later specifications, including the real exchange rate index, which is calculated from the
nominal exchange rate and price indexes in the two countries.
6 The U.S. reference city is Chicago. Foreign cities are major trading cities in the foreign country, usually
the largest city. A list of city pairs and distances is available upon request.
7 The following generalization are based on a comparison with results presented in Frankel (1997). To my
knowledge, Frankel’s study is the most exhaustive and rigorous empirical study of international trade that
employs the gravity model.6
First, the GDP coefficient is somewhat smaller than those commonly estimated, which
tend to be closer to .8. Second, the GDP per-capita coefficient is negative, whereas in
other studies it is often positive, although the coefficient estimates for this term have
been declining in value over the previous three decades from around 0.3 to 0.1. Third,
the distance coefficient is smaller than those commonly found, which hover near -0.6.
Most of these differences likely result from the use of U.S. data alone. The
omission of other country pairs leaves off much of international trade that is commonly
included, most importantly large amounts of (technically) international trade that occurs
within Europe. This later omission likely accounts for at least some portion of the
differing GDP per-capita and distance coefficients. In particular, very large quantities of
intra-European trade occur between rich countries that are close together. Omitting this
trade will likely make the (positive) effects of GDP per-capita and the (negative) effects
of distance seem less important.
Although a U.S. focus can be limiting in terms of comparisons with previous
results, it does have the essential advantage of allowing an investigation of the main
question at hand. In particular, turning to equations 2 and 3 of Table 1, one can examine
the differences in coefficient estimates for equations explaining intrafirm and non-
intrafirm trade. The final column of this table reports a c
2 test that the coefficients in the
equations (2) and (3) are equal. One can easily reject the hypothesis that the whole set of
estimates is identical, and in most individual cases, the individual coefficients are also
statistically different in the two equations. First, the GDP coefficient is slightly larger in
the non-intrafirm trade equation. Second, and more noteworthy, the GDP per-capita
coefficient is dramatically different in the two equations, positive and statistically
significant with a point estimate of 0.17 in the intrafirm specification, and negative and
statistically significant with a point estimate of -0.23 in the non-intrafirm specification.
Third, distance appears to have a larger negative impact on intrafirm trade than on non-
intrafirm trade, although this can only be stated with an 88% level of confidence.
Fourth, the two North American trade agreements have a larger positive effect on
intrafirm trade than on trade conducted at arms-length. Fifth, the U.S. - Israel free trade
agreement does not have a statistically distinguishable effect on intrafirm trade, while it
is positively associated with non-intrafirm trade. Finally, the explanatory power of the
gravity equation regression model as a whole is much higher for non-intrafirm trade than
for intrafirm trade, as can be seen by comparing the R
2 statistics.
How should these findings be interpreted? The first lesson is immediately
obvious. Intrafirm trade is, simply put, different. The gravity equation model has been
one of the most empirically successful models for explaining the volume of international
trade between countries. However, as seen by these results, it is less successful at
accounting for variation in volumes of intrafirm trade. Further, the impact of the
individual factors that are included in the gravity equation models varies substantially
depending on whether one is considering intrafirm trade or conventional, arms-length,
trade. For the six explanatory variables that are included in the model, four of the
coefficients are statistically different with greater than 95% confidence, and all six are
different with greater than 88% confidence. Some of the coefficients (most notably the
GDP per-capita term coefficient) change sign.
Further insights from these results are more subject to individual interpretation. I
will confine myself to some limited observations. First, the coefficient on the GDP per-
capita term is positive for intrafirm trade and negative for non-intrafirm trade. As
discussed in the previous section of the paper, this variable can be interpreted in many7
ways: as capturing how a country’s openness to trade is likely to change with its
development, or in terms of capturing changes in preferences or trading patterns as
countries become richer. From these results, I would simply conclude that the United
States tends to exchange greater volumes of intrafirm trade with countries that have high
per-capita incomes, and to exchange greater volumes of arms-length trade with countries
with lower per-capita incomes. This observation fits the market-access based theories of
foreign direct investment that emphasise a desire by multinational firms to invest in
other countries that have (rich) customers for its products; such investment would also
generate greater volumes of intrafirm trade, as intrafirm trade is a complement to foreign
direct investment.
8 On the other hand, this finding would be less supportive of theories
of foreign direct investment based on factor price differential motivations for
investment, in which multinational firms from high-wage countries like the United
States would be more likely to invest in low-wage (and hence low GDP per-capita)
countries, and hence generate intrafirm trade with such countries. However, we do see
greater levels of arms-length trade with countries with lower per-capita incomes.
Distance has a more negative impact on intrafirm trade than on non-intrafirm
trade. This result could merely capture the possibility that distance discourages foreign
direct investment, and thus intrafirm trade, more even than distance discourages trade
conducted at arms-length. However, two other points are worth mentioning here. First,
Rangan and Lawrence (1999) have argued that multinational firms have networks that
enable them to better cope with imperfect information across international boundaries,
and hence should be able to react more quickly to exchange rate changes. This type of
reasoning could certainly imply that intrafirm trade should also be less sensitive to
distance than conventional trade, since networks are already in place to alleviate
problems of imperfect information that are likely to increase with distance. Second,
Rauch (1996) has argued that trade in differentiated products should be more sensitive to
distance than trade in more homogeneous products with less informational requirements.
Again, assuming that intrafirm trade is in products for which the firm has less
informational requirements, we should see intrafirm trade being less discouraged by
distance than conventional trade, the opposite of what is indicated in Table 2. A greater
discussion of the nature of products traded intrafirm follows below.
  The North American trade agreements (NAFTA and the Canada-United States
Free Trade Agreement) appear to have larger positive association with intrafirm trade
than with arms-length trade, although both types of trade are strongly positively related
to these dummy variables. The U.S.-Israel Free Trade Agreement does not appear to be
associated with increased volumes of intrafirm trade, while it is positively associated
with non-intrafirm trade. Perhaps these results are not too surprising when one considers
that the U.S.-Israel Trade Agreement was a much narrower trade agreement than the
North American agreements. In particular, it was focused primarily on trade
liberalisation, whereas the other agreements contained substantial investment
liberalisation measures in addition to trade liberalisation.
Taxation and Intrafirm Trade
As was discussed in the previous section, a fundamental theoretical distinction
between the behaviour of intrafirm trade and arms-length trade is the potential for
international taxation incentives to affect the former. However, this is complicated by
the presence of three types of effects: a price effect, a quantity effect, and a location
                                               
8 See Clausing (2000a) for one study that demonstrates this relationship.8
effect. Consider first the price effect. Multinational firms may act to minimise their
worldwide tax burdens in ways that affect their intrafirm trade transactions. For instance
(see model in appendix A), there is an incentive to shift income to more lightly taxed
locations by underpricing goods sold to low tax countries and overpricing goods sold to
high tax countries. This would lead one to expect, ceteris paribus, lower (higher)
amounts of intrafirm exports (imports) to (from) low tax countries. There is also a
quantity effect, though. Since intrafirm trade can generate tax savings, it is optimal for
firms to increase the volume of such trade relative to its level in the absence of such
considerations (see Eden (1998, p.298)). Finally, there is a location effect. Low tax
countries may be attractive places to locate foreign direct investment, and this should
lead to more intrafirm trade in both directions (exports and imports), assuming again that
foreign direct investment and intrafirm trade are complements.
Table 3 shows the same specifications as table 2, also including a variable that
measures the effective tax rate in the foreign country.
9 Since this table shows total trade
flows rather than trade prices, it will be unable to isolate the price effect from the
quantity and location effects. The results are similar to those in Table 2 with minor
exceptions. The GDP term is no longer statistically distinguishable in the two
regressions that separate intrafirm and non-intrafirm trade. While the relative magnitude
of the GDP per-capita coefficients is similar, the coefficient on this variable in the
intrafirm trade equation is no longer estimated precisely. The effective tax rate
coefficient is larger in the intrafirm regression than in the non-intrafirm regression,
although it is large and statistically significant in both regressions. At the mean effective
tax rate, these coefficients imply an elasticity with respect to the tax rate of –1.1 for
intrafirm trade, –0.6 for non-intrafirm trade, and –0.8 with respect to all trade.
10 These
results likely indicate that both types of trade are complementary to foreign direct
investment, as low tax countries likely receive more foreign direct investment, and thus
also engage in more trade, particularly intrafirm trade.
11  The quantity effect could also
generate this result, as low tax countries encourage larger volumes of intrafirm trade to
take advantage of tax savings. But this specification tells us less about the price effect,
or the potential transfer price manipulation of multinational firms, since it is not possible
to separate the pricing effect from the quantity and location effects.
Note that a better way to isolate the price effect would be to examine intrafirm
trade balances. While the location and quantity effects should act to increase both
intrafirm exports and intrafirm imports with low tax countries, such effects would have
no effect on the intrafirm trade balance. The price effect, though, would be expected to
worsen (improve) intrafirm trade balances to low (high) tax countries as intrafirm
exports would be underpriced (overpriced) relative to intrafirm imports from such
                                               
9 The effective tax rate is the foreign income tax paid by affiliates in a given country relative to their net
(before-tax) income. While using marginal tax rates is a (theoretically superior) alternative, using marginal
tax rates in practice is very difficult. First, it is harder to get comparable data for this sample of 54
countries and 16 years. Second, the published marginal tax rates are an imperfect proxy for the actual tax
rates firms face since such rates do not account for the many subtleties (tax holidays, ad hoc arrangements,
special allowances, etc.) that determine the true tax treatment of firms.
10 Note that the coefficient reported in Table 3 indicates the elasticity with respect to 1 – Effective Tax
Rate. In the text, I calculate (at the mean effective tax rate) what the implied elasticities are with respect to
the effective tax rate.
11 Note that there is little correlation between measures of trade barriers and this effective tax rate variable
for this sample of countries.9
countries. Clausing (1998) follows this methodology and does find a noticeable impact
of the price effect, or transfer price manipulation, on intrafirm trade flows.
Export and Import Equations
Tables 4 and 5 report separate results for exports and imports for the baseline
specifications; Appendix B reports the same results including the effective tax rate
variable. Estimating exports and imports together has the advantage of focusing on
overall trade patterns without being unduly concerned with macroeconomic
considerations that affect the relative levels of exports and imports.  When one estimates
exports and imports separately, it is more important to include price terms such as a real
exchange rate. Still, empirical researchers have typically not found satisfying results
with such variables in these types of studies. For instance, Frankel (1997) excludes
exchange rate variables since he finds that they tend to fluctuate in sign and are usually
statistically insignificant, and he cites other studies that have reached similar conclusions
(p.142). I too began by including a real exchange rate index variable as well as its lagged
terms. The later were never statistically significant but the contemporaneous exchange
rate always had the predicted effect on non-intrafirm trade.  A stronger dollar is
associated with greater arms-length imports and lesser arms-length exports, with no
discernible effects on intrafirm trade. This greater sensitivity of arms-length trade to
exchange rate changes contrasts with the hypothesis of Rangan and Lawrence (1999)
that intrafirm trade should respond more quickly to exchange rate changes due to the
information advantages that the networks of multinational firms provide.
The bulk of the other results are similar to those found in earlier results: GDP
per-capita has a negative effect on non-intrafirm trade, but not on intrafirm trade;
distance and the North American free trade agreements have a greater estimated effect
on intrafirm trade, although differences are not always statistically significant.  A couple
of differences between the export and import equations stand out, however.  Distance
has a larger negative effect on exports than imports. Per-capita income shows a strong
positive relationship with intrafirm exports and no relationship with intrafirm imports.
This result would be expected if intrafirm imports include substantial amounts of goods
shipped back to the United States from affiliates in poorer countries, where foreign
direct investment has been to a greater extent motivated by factor price differences.
Tables B1 and B2 show similar regressions including the effective tax rate
variable. The results are quite similar to those just discussed. Coefficients on the
effective tax rate variable indicate that intrafirm trade is again, as expected, more
sensitive to tax influences than is arms-length trade.
12
Other Multinational Trade
So far the analysis has focused on examining the empirical difference in the
behaviour of U.S. multinational intrafirm trade and non-intrafirm trade, or trade between
unaffiliated entities. There is a third category of trade that has been excluded from the
analysis, intrafirm trade between foreign multinational parents and their affiliates in the
United States. This exclusion has served three purposes: (1) it has enabled the use of a
                                               
12 It is also interesting to compare the coefficients in the export and import equations. The price effect
discussed above should increase intrafirm exports to high tax countries (as these goods are overpriced)
while decreasing intrafirm imports from high tax countries (as these goods are underpriced).  This implies
(together with the location effect) that high taxes should have a stronger negative effect on intrafirm
imports than on intrafirm exports. The point estimates of the regression coefficients corroborate this
expectation, although these estimates are not statistically significantly distinguishable from one another.10
much greater set of countries than is available if one focused solely on countries that
have substantial investments in the United States, (2) it has enabled the use of
appropriate tax variables, and (3) it has focused the analysis on the empirical behaviour
of U.S. multinational trade in contrast to arms-length trade.
Still, it is useful to examine the nature of intrafirm trade between foreign parent
firms and their affiliates in the United States. In Table 6, I present results that estimate a
gravity equation model for this type of trade. Equation 1 is the baseline specification for
total foreign intrafirm trade, while equations 2 and 3 show separate results for foreign
intrafirm exports and foreign intrafirm imports. Comparing this table with previous
results, a few observations are noteworthy. First, the GDP term and the distance term
coefficients are larger than those in previous specifications, and are closer to estimates
common in gravity equation models. Second, the GDP per-capita term continues to be
positive, indicating that this type of intrafirm trade (like the other) is also positively
associated with a country’s per-capita income. When one examines equations 2 and 3,
one finds that this relationship is entirely due to a very strong positive relationship
between per-capita income and foreign intrafirm imports. It is likely that this
relationship is due in large part to the large volumes of intrafirm imports of Japanese
multinational affiliates in the United States.
13 Third, there appears to be no statistically
discernible effects of the special trading agreements on this type of intrafirm trade.
Fourth, the explanatory power of the regression as a whole is higher for this type of
intrafirm trade than for U.S. multinational intrafirm trade.
Extensions of the Empirical Analysis
Several alternative specifications were tested to see if they changed the results in
a meaningful fashion, particularly for the baseline specifications. First, I included
country fixed effects. This did not appear to change the substantive nature of the results,
nor did it improve the fit of the regression model, so these results are not presented.
Second, I included time-specific fixed effects to test whether events peculiar to
individual years were affecting the results; however, the coefficient estimates were
almost identical to earlier specifications. Third, I tested three individual cross-sections:
for 1982, for 1989, and for 1997. All produced results that were consistent with the
above conclusions. Fourth, I tried testing sub-sections of the data, dividing the data into
three equal time periods, and then two. In the later sub-periods, the coefficient on the
distance variable was not negative. Otherwise, the results were fairly similar across sub-
samples. Finally, I estimated the main specifications excluding the dummy variables for
the trade agreements. The magnitudes of most coefficients were unchanged, although
the distance coefficient was (predictably) larger when these dummy variables were
excluded. Still, the relative magnitudes of the intrafirm and non-intrafirm coefficients
for all variables (including distance) were quite similar with the dummy variables
excluded.
The Composition of Intrafirm Trade
The empirical results have indicated that intrafirm trade is different from
conventional trade conducted at arms-length. This could capture the fact that trade
between different affiliates of multinational firms is motivated by different influences,
such as tax minimisation strategies, or it could capture the fact that multinational firms
respond differently to key economic variables due to their special characteristics. On the
other hand, it could merely capture the fact that the product composition of intrafirm
                                               
13 Japanese affiliate intrafirm imports were 50% of all such foreign intrafirm imports in 1997.11
trade is different from arms-length trade. Unfortunately, when limited to data at this
level of aggregation, it is more straightforward to document the way in which intrafirm
trade is different from arms-length trade than it is to understand the causes of these
differences.
Product composition could be an important consideration.
14 For instance, as
Rauch (1996) has demonstrated empirically, proximity is more important for trade in
differentiated products than for trade in more homogeneous products. Rauch attributes
his finding to a “network/search” view of trade in differentiated products, which holds
that information is more important as well as more difficult to obtain for differentiated
products than for more homogeneous goods.
 15 Such considerations, however, might
lead us to expect that the coefficient on distance should be smaller for intrafirm trade (if
it is the case that such trade is likely to involve more homogeneous products) than for
arms-length trade; a finding opposite to the above empirical results.
 IV. Conclusions
This paper has considered how intrafirm trade, or trade between two affiliates of
the same multinational firm, may behave differently from traditional trade conducted
between unaffiliated firms at arms’ length. A gravity equation model of international
trade was estimated for each type of trade for the United States and 54 trading partners
between 1982 and 1997. The results of the analysis indicate that intrafirm trade is
different from arms-length trade. First, the gravity equation model, long the most
empirically successful model of international trade flows, has far greater explanatory
power with respect to arms-length trade than with respect to intrafirm trade. Second,
most of the individual coefficients in the model are substantially different with respect to
the two types of trade. GDP per-capita typically has a positive effect on intrafirm trade,
and a negative effect on arms-length trade. Distance, the North American free trade
agreements, and the tax variable all appear to have larger effects on intrafirm trade than
arms-length trade. Exchange rates, on the other hand, appear to have a larger influence
on arms-length trade.
 A priori, there are several reasons to suspect that intrafirm trade may differ from
trade conducted at arms-length. Intrafirm trade is more likely to be affected by
international tax incentives, intrafirm trade may be different due to the special nature of
multinational firms, and the product composition of intrafirm trade may differ from that
of arms-length trade. The above empirical results indicate several specific ways in which
intrafirm trade behaves differently within a gravity equation model of international
                                               
14 One way to separate the effects of the composition of trade from the fact that trade is intrafirm would be
to employ more detailed data. At this point, the options are limited, but the Bureau of Economic Analysis
does report some data on intrafirm exports that is broken down by intended use: goods for resale and
goods for further manufacture. However, these data are only provided for exports, and for years when a
benchmark survey is done: 1982, 1989, and 1994. One can do an analysis similar to the equations
presented in Tables 4 and B1, further dividing intrafirm exports into those for further manufacture and
those for resale. In general, the trade in goods for resale behaves much closer to non-intrafirm trade than
does trade in goods for further manufacture. However, the coefficients on several of the variables are less
precisely estimated than those in the specifications that make use of the full data set. Tables of results are
available upon request.
15 Rangan and Lawrence (1999) have argued that multinational firms will be better able to overcome these
network/search problems. However, if multinationals primarily trade in input products, which are in turn
more homogeneous than average, than it may be difficult to separate these two considerations.12
trade. One area for future research is to examine how much of these differences are due
to the fact that such trade occurs within the firm, and how much of the differences are
due to the product composition of intrafirm trade. While the results above do not
conform with what one would expect due to the product composition of intrafirm trade,
more research is required to carefully separate these effects.
Most previous empirical studies of international trade have not considered the
potential differences in the behaviour of intrafirm and non-intrafirm trade. However,
understanding these differences allows an improved understanding of the determinants
of international trade, the effects of trade agreements and policies, and the role of
geography in trade.  This paper has documented noteworthy differences between the
empirical behaviour of intrafirm trade and that of arms-length trade. While further
investigation into the causes of these differences is important, it is hoped that this
research will contribute to an improved understanding of international trade patterns.13
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Figure 1:  U.S. Trade with All Partners, 1994
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Table 1. Summary Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean St. Dev.
Exportsijt, in million U.S. $ 864  6,385  13,261
Importsijt, in million U.S. $ 858  8,907  19,392
Intrafirm Exportsijt, in mil. $ 807  1,845  5,164
Intrafirm Importsijt, in mil. $ 692  1,738  5,761
GDPjt, in bil. 1990 U.S. $ 854   251.6   473.3
GDP per-capitajt , in 1990 U.S. $ 854  9,710  9,912
Effective Tax Ratejt 757   .341   .202
Real Exchange Rate Index, 1980=100 860   115.0    37.11
Distanceij, in miles 864  4,907  2,320
Notes: The subscript i indicates the United States, subscript j indicates a trading partner;
and t indicates years. Summary statistics are given where data are available for the
period between 1982 and 1997 for 54 trading partners. All trade data are in millions of
(current) U.S. dollars; in the following specifications, these data are indexed to constant
1990 dollars using U.S. export and import price indexes. GDP and GDP per-capita are in
constant 1990 U.S. dollars. The effective tax rate is defined as the taxes paid by affiliates
in a given country relative to their net, before-tax, income. The real exchange rate index
is calculated from the nominal exchange rate and price indexes in the two countries.
Distance is calculated between major cities in the U.S. and the partner country, using
Chicago as the U.S. reference city.
Sources: Export and import data come from the U.S. International Trade Commission;
data on intrafirm trade, taxes, and net incomes are from the U.S. Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA). Data on GDP, GDP per-capita, and all other macroeconomic variables
are from the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics yearbooks.19
Table 2. Gravity Equation Regressions Estimating US Trade Flows, 1982-97
Independent
Variables:
(1)
Total Trade
(2)
Intrafirm Trade
(3)
Non-
Intrafirm
Trade
Test that
Intrafirm
Coefficient =
Non-If. Coef.
GDP Term  .5798
 (.0252)
 .5076
 (.0397)
 .5990
 (.0244)
c
2 = 8.04
Prob = 0.005
GDP Per- Capita
Term
 -.1572
 (.0286)
 .1688
 (.0450)
 -.2294
 (.0277)
c
2 = 118.3
Prob = 0.000
Distance  -.1553
 (.0654)
 -.2844
 (.1029)
 -.1511
 (.0634)
c
2 = 2.54
Prob = 0.111
CUSFTA  2.289
 (.3029)
 2.800
 (.4771)
 2.086
 (.2939)
c
2 = 3.38
Prob = 0.066
NAFTA  1.937
 (.4089)
 2.861
 (.6440)
 1.755
 (.3967)
c
2 = 4.46
Prob = 0.035
Israel FTA  .6458
 (.2864)
 -.4419
 (.4511)
 .8838
 (.2779)
c
2 = 13.07
Prob = 0.000
Number Obs. 667 667 667
R
2 .560 .424 .567
Notes: Variables are defined as in equation (2) of the text. Summary statistics and data
sources are given in Table 1 above. All variables that are not dummy variables are in
logs. Standard errors are in parentheses.20
Table 3. Gravity Equation Regressions Estimating U.S. Trade Flows, 1982-97
(with Effective Tax Rate included as an explanatory variable)
Independent
Variables:
(1)
Total Trade
(2)
Intrafirm Trade
(3)
Non-Intrafirm
Trade
Test that
Intrafirm
Coefficient =
Non-If. Coef.
GDP Term  .6780
 (.0275)
 .6546
 (.0433)
 .6775
 (.0271)
c
2 = 0.40
Prob = 0.526
GDP Per- Capita
Term
 -.2826
 (.0319)
 -.0312
 (.0503)
 -.3274
 (.0315)
c
2 = 49.89
Prob = 0.000
Distance  -.1558
 (.0645)
 -.2670
 (.1019)
 -.1490
 (.0637)
c
2 = 1.93
Prob = 0.165
CUSFTA  2.323
 (.2921)
 2.875
 (.4610)
 2.119
 (.2885)
c
2 = 3.86
Prob = 0.049
NAFTA  1.743
 (.3936)
 2.559
 (.6212)
 1.607
 (.388)
c
2 = 3.38
Prob = 0.066
Israel FTA  .4941
 (.2755)
 -.6633
 (.4348)
 .7669
 (.2721)
c
2 = 15.55
Prob = 0.000
1-Effective Tax
Rate
 1.517
 (.1845)
 2.137
 (.2912)
 1.195
 (.1822)
c
2 = 15.04
Prob = 0.000
Number Obs. 628 628 628
R
2 .599 .461 .592
Notes: Variables are defined as in equation (2) of the text. Summary statistics and data
sources are given in Table 1 above. All variables that are not dummy variables are in
logs. Standard errors are in parentheses.21
Table 4. Gravity Equation Regressions Estimating U.S. Exports, 1982-97
Independent
Variables:
(1)
Total Exports
(2)
Intrafirm
Exports
(3)
Non-Intrafirm
Exports
Test that
Intrafirm
Coefficient =
Non-If. Coef.
GDP Term  .5839
 (.0217)
 .6010
 (.0350)
 .5826
 (.0226)
c
2 = 0.37
Prob = 0.543
GDP Per- Capita
Term
 -.1097
 (.0252)
 .3441
 (.0407)
 -.2103
 (.0262)
c
2 = 251.1
Prob = 0.000
Distance  -.3396
 (.0628)
 -.5857
 (.1015)
 -.3286
 (.0653)
c
2 = 8.71
Prob = 0.003
CUSFTA  1.883
 (.3031)
 1.884
 (.4900)
 1.779
 (.3155)
c
2 = 0.06
Prob = 0.804
NAFTA  1.778
 (.4114)
 2.555
 (.6653)
 1.646
 (.4284)
c
2 = 2.53
Prob = 0.112
Israel FTA  .5833
 (.2290)
-1.646
 (.3703)
 .8943
 (.2384)
c
2 = 63.79
Prob = 0.000
Real Exchange
Rate Index
 -.2167
 (.0970)
 -.1235
 (.1569)
 -.2393
 (.1010)
c
2 = 0.74
Prob = 0.390
Number Obs. 790 790 790
R
2 .580 .514 .538
Notes: Variables are defined as in equation (2) of the text. Summary statistics and data
sources are given in Table 1 above. All variables that are not dummy variables are in
logs. Standard errors are in parentheses.22
Table 5. Gravity Equation Regressions Estimating US Imports, 1982-97
Independent
Variables:
(1)
Total Imports
(2)
Intrafirm
Imports
(3)
Non-Intrafirm
Imports
Test that
Intrafirm
Coefficient =
Non-If. Coef.
GDP Term  .6191
 (.0296)
 .5565
 (.0680)
 .6559
 (.0288)
c
2 = 2.83
Prob = 0.093
GDP Per- Capita
Term
 -.2123
 (.0344)
 .0658
 (.0792)
 -.2651
 (.0335)
c
2 = 23.15
Prob = 0.000
Distance  -.1128
 (.0780)
 -.4721
 (.1792)
 -.1342
 (.0758)
c
2 = 4.71
Prob = 0.030
CUSFTA  2.568
 (.3614)
 3.340
 (.8307)
 2.229
 (.3511)
c
2 = 2.37
Prob = 0.124
NAFTA  2.098
 (.4879)
 3.475
(1.122)
 1.831
 (.4740)
c
2 = 2.85
Prob = 0.091
Israel FTA  .9571
 (.3437)
 1.025
 (.7900)
 1.114
 (.3339)
c
2 = 0.02
Prob = 0.897
Real Exchange
Rate Index
 .4129
 (.1227)
 .0380
 (.2819)
 .4060
 (.1192)
c
2 = 2.26
Prob = 0.133
Number Obs. 665 665 665
R
2 .503 .211 .525
Notes: Variables are defined as in equation (2) of the text. Summary statistics and data
sources are given in Table 1 above. All variables that are not dummy variables are in
logs. Standard errors are in parentheses.23
Table 6. Gravity Equation Regressions Estimating Foreign Intrafirm Trade, 1982-97
Independent
Variables:
(1)
Foreign
Intrafirm
Trade
(2)
Foreign
Intrafirm
Exports
(3)
Foreign
Intrafirm
Imports
GDP Term  .7885
 (.0425)
 .8254
 (.0585)
 .8361
 (.0469)
GDP Per- Capita
Term
 .3358
 (.0817)
 -.0730
 (.1008)
 .6868
 (.0734)
Distance  -.4590
 (.1358)
 -.2495
 (.1444)
 -.6516
 (.1444)
CUSFTA  .1040
 (.4743)
 -.2058
 (.4206)
 -.1350
 (.5385)
NAFTA  -.0377
 (.6022)
-1.249
 (.5110)
 .6077
 (.7022)
Israel FTA  -.3486
 (.4157)
 -.3983
 (.5473)
 .4769
 (.5572)
Number Obs. 383 218 431
Adjusted R
2 .546 .547 .592
Notes: Foreign Intrafirm Trade is trade between foreign parent firms and their affiliates
in the United States. Foreign Intrafirm Exports are U.S. exports sent by foreign affiliates
in the U.S. to their foreign based parents; Foreign Intrafirm Imports are U.S. imports
destined for affiliates in the United States from their foreign based parents. Other
variables are defined as in equation (2) of the text. Data sources are given in Table 1
above. All variables that are not dummy variables are in logs. Standard errors are in
parentheses.24
Appendix A
A Model of Transfer Pricing and Intrafirm Trade
Following Horst (1971) and Kant (1995), one can produce a simple model that
generates the prediction that intrafirm trade prices will be affected by the tax
minimisation strategies of multinational firms. Consider a multinational firm with some
degree of market power that is operating in two countries. It produces and sells in each
country, and also exports part of its output from the home country (1) to the affiliate
abroad (2).
16 For now, assume that the affiliate is fully owned.
17
Profit functions for operations in the two countries are given by the following
equations:
   ð1  =  R1 (s1) - C1 (s1 + m) + pm (1)
  ð2  =  R2 (s2) - C2 (s2 - m) - pm (2)
ð1 is profit in the home country, which depends on revenues R1 that are a function of
sales, s1, and costs C1 that are a function of production. Production includes both those
goods sold at home, and those sent to the affiliate abroad, m. The output that is exported
to the affiliates abroad is given the transfer price p.
Consider the case where tax rates at home are greater than tax rates abroad
(t1>t2) and deferral is allowed. Let f represent the fraction of profits that are repatriated.
The effective tax rate on income earned in the affiliate country is then:
   t2e  =  t2 + (t1 - t2) f (3)
The net profit function for the firm's global operations is:
ð  =  (1-t1) ð1 + (1-t2e) ð2 (4)
To illustrate how the firm may choose a transfer price in order to maximize these net
profits, consider the derivative of (4) with respect to the transfer price, p.
  ðp  =  (1-t1) m - (1-t2e) m (5)
Substituting for t2e using (3) and rearranging,
   ðp  =  -(t1-t2) (1-f) m  (6)
So, if t1>t2, the above expression is negative, and the firm's net profits decrease with the
transfer price. Thus, firms have an incentive to underprice goods sold to low tax
                                               
16It is straightforward to extend this model to consider trade that originates in the affiliate country. One
can also consider this trade to be in intermediate products without affecting the basic insights developed
here.
17The implications of relaxing this assumption are considered in Kant (1995) and briefly discussed below.25
countries in order to shift profits to low tax locations. Similarly, one can show that firms
have an incentive to overprice goods sold to high tax affiliates when t2 > t1.
18 
19
                                               
18Note that these models implicitly assume that there is only one transfer price p; that is, firms keep just
one set of books. Firms in reality may keep more than one set of books, using one set of prices to
minimize tax liabilities and other sets of prices for other purposes such as determining the relative
performance of affiliates.
19 As Kant (1990) reminds us, though, two considerations may interfere with this motivation. First of all,
firms may be subject to penalties if their manipulation of transfer prices is too flagrant. If the probability
of receiving a penalty increases as the transfer price is further from the arms-length price, firms will likely
choose a transfer price that balances the gain from profit shifting with the possibility of a penalty. This
consideration alters the degree of transfer price manipulation, but would not alter the desired direction of
underpricing or overpricing. Second, affiliates may not be wholly owned. This creates a second profit
shifting incentive, as firms may choose to overprice shipments to affiliates to transfer profits to sources
that are wholly owned and away from partially owned sources. While this consideration may influence the
desired direction of transfer price changes, it also assumes that firms are free to manipulate transfer prices
without the need to be responsive to the profits of their minority interests.26
Appendix B: Export and Import Regressions including the Effective Tax Rate
Table B1: Gravity Equation Regressions Estimating U.S. Exports, 1982-1997
(with Effective Tax Rate included as an explanatory variable)
Independent
Variables:
(1)
Total Exports
(2)
Intrafirm
Exports
(3)
Non-Intrafirm
Exports
Test that
Intrafirm
Coefficient =
Non-If. Coef.
GDP Term  .6721
 (.0228)
 .7169
 (.0367)
 .6634
 (.0243)
c
2 = 2.68
Prob = 0.102
GDP Per- Capita
Term
 -.2255
 (.0269)
 .1661
 (.0432)
 -.3132
 (.0287)
c
2 = 154.9
Prob = 0.000
Distance  -.3413
 (.0611)
 -.5522
 (.0983)
 -.3310
 (.0652)
c
2 = 6.39
Prob = 0.012
CUSFTA  1.895
 (.2869)
 1.964
 (.4617)
 1.789
 (.3061)
c
2 = 0.18
Prob = 0.671
NAFTA  1.566
 (.3883)
 2.251
 (.6250)
 1.459
 (.4144)
c
2 = 2.03
Prob = 0.155
Israel FTA  .4952
 (.2163)
-1.842
 (.3482)
 .8265
 (.2308)
c
2 = 74.1
Prob = 0.000
Real Exchange
Rate Index
 -.2150
 (.1011)
 -.1835
 (.1628)
 -.2338
 (.1079)
c
2 = 0.12
Prob = 0.729
1- Effective Tax
Rate
 1.724
 (.1578)
 2.532
 (.2539)
 1.506
 (.1684)
c
2 = 20.6
Prob = 0.000
Number Obs. 729 729 729
R
2 .629 .564 .575
Note: Variables are defined as in equation (2) of the text. Summary statistics and data
sources are given in Table 1 above. All variables that are not dummy variables are in
logs. Standard errors are in parentheses.27
Table B2: Gravity Equation Regressions Estimating U.S. Imports, 1982-1997
(with Effective Tax Rate included as an explanatory variable)
Independent
Variables:
(1)
Total Imports
(2)
Intrafirm
Imports
(3)
Non-Intrafirm
Imports
Test that
Intrafirm
Coefficient =
Non-If. Coef.
GDP Term  .7105
 (.0322)
 .7721
 (.0734)
 .7281
 (.0316)
c
2 = 0.47
Prob = 0.494
GDP Per- Capita
Term
 -.3477
 (.0383)
 -.2636
 (.0874)
 -.3720
 (.0377)
c
2 = 2.00
Prob = 0.157
Distance  -.0904
 (.0769)
 -.4061
 (.1755)
 -.1066
 (.0756)
c
2 = 3.79
Prob = 0.052
CUSFTA  2.646
 (.3478)
 3.504
 (.7932)
 2.310
 (.3419)
c
2 = 2.95
Prob = 0.086
NAFTA  1.911
 (.4688)
 3.004
(1.069)
 1.694
 (.4608)
c
2 = 1.95
Prob = 0.162
Israel FTA  .7840
 (.3303)
  .6295
 (.7534)
 .9772
 (.3247)
c
2 = 0.28
Prob = 0.599
Real Exchange
Rate Index
 .3426
 (.1293)
 -.2292
 (.2948)
 .3386
 (.1271)
c
2 = 4.82
Prob = 0.028
Effective Tax Rate  1.421
 (.2206)
 2.957
 (.5032)
 1.094
 (.2169)
c
2 = 17.8
Prob = 0.000
Number Obs. 626 626 626
R
2 .540 .256 .552
Note: Variables are defined as in equation (2) of the text. Summary statistics and data
sources are given in Table 1 above. All variables that are not dummy variables are in
logs. Standard errors are in parentheses.